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The conventional wisdom in political science is that for a democracy to be consolidated, all groups
must have a chance to attain power. If they do not then they will subvert democracy and choose to
fight for power. In this paper we show that this wisdom is seriously incomplete because it considers
absolute, not relative payoffs. Although the probability of winning an election increases with the size
of a group, so does the probability of winning a fight. Thus in a situation where all groups have a high
chance of winning an election, they may also have a high chance of winning a fight. Indeed, in a natural
model, we show that democracy may never be consolidated in such a situation. Rather, democracy
may only be stable when one group is dominant. We provide a test of a key aspect of our model using
data from "La Violencia", a political conflict in Colombia during the years 1946-1950 between the
Liberal and Conservative parties. Consistent with our results, and contrary to the conventional wisdom,
we show that fighting between the parties was more intense in municipalities where the support of
the parties was more evenly balanced.
Mario Chacon
Yale Univ., Dept. of Political Science
PO Box 208301





N309, 1737 Cambridge Street









When Mauritius and Guyana became independent from Britain in 1968 and 1966,
respectively, political conﬂict had coalesced into a struggle between those of East Indian
descent and the rest. In Mauritius, East Indians comprised about 70% of the population
and their interests were represented by the Labour Party headed by Seewoosagur Ram-
goolam. In contrast, East Indians were only 50% of the population in Guyana under the
leadership of the People’s Progressive Party headed by Cheddi Jagan.
The conventional wisdom in political science makes a clear prediction about which
country was more likely to become a consolidated democracy. This prediction is based on
t h ei d e at h a tg r o u p sc a ne i t h e rﬁght for power or they can instead decide to compete for
votes and abide by the outcome of elections. Democracy will arise and be consolidated
when all the groups anticipate that they have a chance of power in democracy. If they do
not then they will ﬁght. As Przeworski (1991, pp. 30-31) puts it,
“compliance depends on the probability of winning within the democratic
institutions. A particular actor ... will comply if the probability it attaches
to being victorious in democratic competition ... is greater than some mini-
mum ... Democracy will evoke generalized compliance when all the relevant
political forces have some speciﬁc minimum probability of doing well under
the particular system of institutions.”
The clear implication of this line of thinking is that it was Guyana which was more
likely to be a democracy. In Mauritius, those who opposed the Labour Party had no
chance of attaining power in a society where voting was along ethnic lines. In Guyana they
did, and hence the anti-East Indian coalition led by Forbes Burnham’s People’s National
Party could win an election. In contrast in Mauritius the anti-East Indian coalition led
by Gaetan Duval and his PMSD (Parti Mauricien Social Democrate) had no chance of
winning a majority of votes and therefore would be driven to subverting democracy. That
this was evidently not what happened in these two countries is illustrated by Figure 1
which shows their Polity scores since independence. In fact, in Guyana Burnham created
a one-party state with himself as dictator while Mauritius has experienced open and
democratic political competition. What went wrong?
1In reality there are many sources of variation in the political regimes of countries and
the reason the conventional wisdom in political science fails to explain what happened in
Mauritius and Guyana could be due to any number of idiosyncratic factors. In this paper
however we argue that actually the failure of the predictions of the conventional wisdom
is indicative of a serious ﬂaw in the underlying logic. This logic is incomplete because it
only considers half of the story. While it may be true that compliance with the rules of
democracy depends in part on the probability of winning within democratic institutions,
it clearly also depends on the probability of winning a ﬁght. In a natural model, these
two things are closely connected. Indeed, the greater the chance that a group wins an
election may correspond to a greater chance that it wins a ﬁght.
If the outcome of elections are close, so that all groups anticipate being able to attain
power in a democracy, then all groups have evenly matched support, or ‘strength’ in soci-
ety. But strength does not simply map into votes in elections, it also determines ﬁghting
strength. Therefore, it is precisely in the circumstances when groups have equal strength
that they may ﬁnd it optimal to ﬁght. When the parameters imply that democratic pol-
itics is competitive therefore, they also imply that ﬁghting is attractive. Indeed, it can
be situations where strength is asymmetric, where elections are lopsided, that ﬁghting
may not be attractive and democracy will be stable. The intuition for this is immediate.
When power is asymmetric, there is a dominant group, and the smaller group does not
ﬁght because, even though it cannot win an election, the probability of success in ﬁghting
is so small.
To illustrate this idea we develop a model of political competition between two po-
litical parties. The parties can either follow a democratic strategy and use policies to
attract votes, or alternatively they can ﬁght for power. We assume that people in the
population have preferences not only over income but also over ideology, so that they
may be more or less attached to one of the parties (as in a standard probabilistic voting
model). We then examine the circumstances under which democracy is preferred by both
parties to ﬁghting and how this depends on their underlying support in the population. In
the natural model we build, we show that democracy may only emerge as an equilibrium
when support is asymmetric in the sense that one of the parties dominates the other.
In contrast, when the support of parties is balanced, or in other words in circumstances
2when both parties have a good chance of winning power in democracy, ﬁghting may occur.
The model shows that while democracy can arise when support is symmetric, it does so
in a way inconsistent with the conventional wisdom since it is the stronger party, which
though it would do better under democracy than the weaker party, nevertheless initiates
conﬂict. Thus the conventional wisdom is never correct in our model.
These results are exactly the opposite of the conventional wisdom because schol-
ars such as Przeworski (1991) or Weingast (1997) who have studied the circumstances
under which democracy is preferred to ﬁghting have focused only on the payoﬀsf r o m
democracy with an exogenous payoﬀ to ﬁghting, independent of the democratic payoﬀ.
In consequence they emphasize the idea that the circumstance most propitious to the
consolidation of democracy is when parties are competitive, in the sense that both are
evenly matched. We show that this result is overturned when the payoﬀs to democracy
and ﬁghting are interlinked. Colomer (2000, p. 10) reiterates this view when he writes
that “the establishment of democracy appears as a conventional agreement on new rules
of the political game. Agreement is possible because democracy gives diﬀerent actors rea-
sonable expectations to gain or share power in some undetermined future.” In this case
both can hope to attain power via elections and neither is tempted to abandon democracy
and ﬁght for power. We show, to the contrary, that this is precisely the situation where
the use of violence to attain political power may become most attractive.
In addition to providing a model which clariﬁes the relationship between democracy
and ﬁghting, we investigate one of the implications of the model empirically. Though the
example of Mauritius and Guyana is telling, it is diﬃcult to pursue the issues empirically
using cross-national data. In most societies it is hard to measure the “support” of dif-
ferent groups or to calculate how likely they are to win elections. We therefore turn to
within national data where we can at least investigate the relationship between political
competition, support and the propensity to ﬁght. Our model should apply in countries
where there is a clear distinction between diﬀerent political groups and where violence is
politically motivated. One of the clearest examples of such a country is Colombia. Since
the 1850s Colombia has been governed primarily by civilian governments of the Liberal
or Conservative parties. Periods of military rule have been very short and the traditional
view of Colombian society is that people have historically identiﬁed strongly with one
3party or the other. The period since 1850 has seen both elections and civil wars between
the two parties, the most recent being La Violencia which began in the mid 1940s and
lasted until the early 1960s and in which between 100,000 and 200,000 people were killed.
La Violencia was contested between the parties who formed local militias and guerillas
and fought over the control of various parts of the country. We cannot use this experience
to really test the model, but it does allow us to investigate a crucial implication - in situ-
ations where support for the parties was evenly balanced we can observe conﬂict, whereas
where one of the parties was dominant, we observe peace. As we show in section 3, subject
to the usual caveats about identiﬁc a t i o n ,t h i si se x a c t l yw h at the data demonstrates.
If the conventional wisdom does not explain what factors induce democracy, what
does? Taken literally, our analysis suggests that the conditions for democracy are the
opposite of what is believed by political scientists. However, another interpretation is that
probably the issues on which scholars have focused are second-order compared to other
factors which promote democracy, such as the costs of conﬂict. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006) develop a series of models where these costs are inﬂuenced by the structure of the
economy and asset holdings and this may be a much more important source of variation
in reality. In our model if the cost of conﬂict is suﬃciently high, democracy is preferred
at any distribution of support.
Our paper is related to the formal literature modelling the creation and consolidation
of democracy. Most closely related, Rosendorﬀ (2001) also examines the trade-oﬀ between
ﬁghting and democracy, but focuses on factors that make democracy relatively less costly
for the combatants, such as lower inequality. The work by Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000, 2001, 2006) focuses on how democracy arises as a method of making credible
commitments to avoid social conﬂict. They show how the consolidation of democracy
depends on the ability of authoritarian elites to contest power in democracy. Speciﬁcally,
when elites do better in democracy, for example by forming successful political parties,
democracy becomes more tolerable and is more likely to be consolidated (subject to the
caveat that if elites do too well then democracy will be unconsolidated because it does
not deliver enough to the majority). Nevertheless, in their model the outcome of conﬂict
is deterministic and independent of the size of the groups contesting power. The analysis
presented here shows that when the technology of conﬂict is modelled more explicitly
4there is an oﬀsetting eﬀect - though greater elite strength in democracy makes it more
tolerable, it also makes it easier to overthrow democracy. This suggests that the eﬀect of
elite strength on democratic consolidation is more complex, though obviously this depends
on the source of that strength.1 Other papers, such as by Conley and Temimi (2001),
Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003), Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Llavador and Oxoby (2005),
also do not discuss the issues which are the focus of this paper. For example, the latter
two papers examine how elites may voluntarily extend voting rights to maximize their
payoﬀs and so the issue of the consolidation of democracy does not arise.
The literature on conﬂict and international warfare has also posed in various ways
the question about which situations make conﬂict more likely. This research emphasizes
resources rather than people as an input into conﬂi c ta n das o u r c eo fp o w e r . T h i si s
possibly because the literature on the collective action problem has stressed the idea that
larger groups have less rather than more power. Nevertheless, as Esteban and Ray (2001)
have shown, this is not a general implication of models of collective action and in our
model there are organizations, political parties, who mobilize support and thus there is
no collective action problem.
Early work by Hirshleifer (1991) and Skaperdas (1992) emphasized the ‘paradox of
p o w e r ’w h e r ea s y m m e t r i cs i t u a t i o n sc r e a t ec o n ﬂict. In these models the initial distribution
of resources does not inﬂuence the equilibrium outcome. Subsequent work however showed
that conﬂict may be maximized when ‘power’ is either balanced or unbalanced. On the
one hand, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997) showed that in more general versions of the
Hirshleifer-Skaperdas model an agent’s probability of winning a conﬂict is increasing in his
relative endowment. In their model, if there is some cost of ﬁghting, conﬂi c ti sm o r el i k e l y
1Acemoglu and Robinson (2005, Chapter 6) note another reason why the conventional wisdom we
question in this paper may be incorrect. In their model of democracy, the elite who dominate nondemoc-
racy can never win power because policies always cater to the preference of the median voter. However,
they shows that this does not mean that the elite cannot get what they want in a democracy because
they may be able to threaten to undermine democracy. In response to such threats, the policies of the
median voter will cater to the preferences of the elite despite the fact that the elite itself do not form
the government. Indeed there is an irony here because according to the conventional wisdom, if the elite
cannot form a government then they will try to mount a coup and hence democracy is not consolidated.
Yet if they can overthrow the system by force then they must have eﬀective power and this is exactly
the situation where they will be able to get what they want from the government without having to
overthrow it. When the elite do not have such power, they do not get what they want from democracy,
but neither are they able to mount a coup. Hence the conventional wisdom is also false in the framework
of Acemoglu and Robinson although for a diﬀerent reason than in our paper.
5when endowments are skewed. On the other hand, Esteban and Ray (1999) showed that
in their model conﬂict was maximized when society was polarized into two evenly matched
groups, and Bates (2000) argued that ethnic conﬂict was greatest in such situations.
None of these papers compare the option of ﬁghting to dividing the pie in other ways.
More closely related therefore is the research which studies what sorts of negotiations can
avoid conﬂict. The main result in this literature is that, as Powell (1999, p.9) puts it,
“War is least likely when the international distribution of beneﬁts reﬂects the underlying
distribution of power.” Anbarci, Skaperdas, and Syropoulos (2002) also study how various
bargaining solutions can determine the distribution of resources ‘under the shadow of
power’ without conﬂict taking place. The diﬀerence in our paper is that we ﬁx a set of
institutions, democracy, that distributes the beneﬁts in a speciﬁcw a y .T h i si sl e s sﬂexible
than some bargaining solution, but it does reﬂect the underlying distribution of power in
the sense that we model this as ‘support’ and both the expected utility of ﬁghting and that
of democracy is increasing in support. However, as we show, in a natural model they do
not increase at the same rate. Powell’s remark precisely characterizes the circumstances
under which ﬁghting occurs in our model. Our main point is that in a natural model it is
much more likely to happen when support is symmetric, which is exactly the circumstances
where the conventional wisdom in comparative politics asserts that democracy is more
attractive.
II. A Model
In this section we develop a model of the trade-oﬀ between ﬁghting and democracy.
To see the ideas at work it is simplest to consider a situation where there are two political
parties, denoted L and C contesting power. These parties care about being in power, and
the beneﬁt of being in power is the income of the state from tax revenues, natural resources
etc. that is not transferred back to the population. The groups vie for the support
of citizens. There is one group of such citizens with total population mass normalized
to 1. Citizens are endowed initially with some income, which we assume is a stock of
the single consumption good in the economy, and in a democracy the parties compete
by oﬀering redistributive policies. Citizens get utility from consumption, and also, as
in the standard probabilistic voting model of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Dixit and
6Londregan (1996, 1998) and Persson and Tabellini (2000), from ﬁxed characteristics of
the political parties which we associate with ‘ideology.’ Individuals are heterogeneous
with respect to this characteristic and we assume that the parties know the distribution
of these characteristics.
When there is democracy the parties compete non-cooperatively to win the support
of citizens by oﬀering tax and transfer policies. The party which wins most votes wins the
election, takes power and consumes the rents which are implied by its’ policy platform.
When power is contested by ﬁghting, political parties attempt to win support by coercing
people into ﬁghting for them. The probability that a party wins the ﬁght is increasing
in the number of citizens who support it. The key diﬀerence in our model is that in a
democracy parties do not know who voted for them and cannot make policy conditional
on this. When parties ﬁght however it is clear who supports who and this allows parties
to target punishments or rewards.
We now develop our model of democracy.
A. Democracy
We assume that the utility of consumption is linear and that all individuals have the
same endowment of income, denoted y ≥ 0. Parties compete by noncooperatively oﬀering
income transfers to voters which are not individual speciﬁc. Given a vector of policies
(yL,y C) oﬀered by the two parties, an individual i supports party L if,
y + yL >y+ yC + δ + σ
i. (1)
Here y+yL is the income (and therefore consumption and utility) of an individual which is
made up of initial income y, plus the transfer promised by party L, yL.2 This is the total
utility of voting for L. On the right side of the inequality, y + yC is income when voting
for party C. δ and σi are the characteristics of the parties unrelated to their economic
promises - ‘overall popularity δ’ and ‘ideology σi’. The interpretation of δ + σi is that it
represents the utility which is independent of economic policy to individual i of voting for
2For simplicity we proceed by assuming that yL ≥ 0 and yC ≥ 0 but one can easily think of the vector
(yL,y C) as being transfers net of taxes, in which case it is possible that they are negative in equilibrium.
The qualitative results of that model are identical to the one we study here.
7C. These are preferences over some unalterable characteristic of the party. δ is common
to all, but σi is speciﬁc to each individual.














with density h>0.T h u sas h a r eμ ∈ [0,1] of the population has an ideological
bias towards party L,w h i l eas h a r e1 − μ of the population has an ideological bias in
favor of party C.I fμ = 1
2 we are back in the standard version of the probabilistic voting
model, where ideology is symmetrically distributed for the two parties. If μ>1
2 we have
a situation where the distribution of ideology is skewed to the left so that a majority
ideologically prefers party L, while if μ<1
2 party C enjoys an ideological advantage.
Thus μ may be though of as the share of the population that sympathizes with party L,
alternatively we may think of μ as the share of the population in one particular ethnic
group associated with party L,e t c .W es h a l la l s or e f e rt oμ and 1 − μ as measuring the
underlying or the intrinsic support for a party.
For given policies and aggregate shock δ we can now calculate the fraction of people
who support L.T od ot h i sd e ﬁne a critical value of σi, denoted e σ
i, such that all individuals
with σi < e σ
i strictly prefer to vote for L. Clearly from (1),
e σ
i = yL − yC − δ. (2)





hdi = μ + h(yL − yC − δ) (3)
using the fact that the distribution of σi is uniform. The probability that L wins the
election, denoted π ∈ [0,1], is simply the probability that this fraction is greater than one
half of the population, or,
π =P r
½



























8Consider now the optimal strategy of party L in a democracy. Party L’s optimization
problem can be written
max
yL
π(R − yL). (5)
Here R>0 denotes the exogenous (gross) rents from winning power. Taking into account
(4), the ﬁrst-order condition for the choice of yL that maximizes expected utility is
φ(R − yL) − π =0 . (6)
( 6 )h a san i c ei n t e r p r e t a t i o n .T h eﬁrst term, φ(R − yL),i st h em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁto fi n c r e a s -
ing the amount of income transfer oﬀered to citizens. Holding constant the net amount of
rents, (R − yL), this increases the probability that L wins the election by φ, the density
of δ. The second term, π, is the expected marginal cost of this. Holding constant the
probability of winning, expected utility falls by π when the party oﬀers voters more; π is
simply the probability of winning the election so that the politician has to deliver these
promises. Thus, note from (4) that on an expected basis election promises are, other
things equal, more costly for a party that has an ideological advantage in the population.
Since such a party is more likely to win the election there is a larger probability that
the promises have to be delivered. In contrast, if a party has little ideological support,
election promises are cheap as they most likely will not have to be paid for.















Since the probability that party C wins the election is 1 − π, it solves the optimization
problem, maxyC (1 − π)(R − yC). Maximizing this with respect to yC gives,
φ(R − yC) − (1 − π)=0 , (8)















A (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium in this model is a vector of policies, (yL,y C) that
simultaneously satisfy (9) and (7). Such an equilibrium exists here as the second-order
9conditions for the two maximization problems are satisﬁed. Moreover, the equilibrium is
unique. By solving (9) and (7) we ﬁnd
















Consider ﬁrst the case studied in the standard model of probabilistic voting where
t h et w oi d e o l o g i c a lg r o u p sa r eo ft h es a m es i z e ;μ = 1
2. Then we get the well known
result of policy convergence - the two groups oﬀer the same policy. As a consequence,
yL − yC =0 , and each party has a probability of 1
2 of winning the election. Politicians
oﬀer more income transfers the higher the rents of having power R,a n dt h em o r ev o t e r s
care about economic relative to other factors (high φ).
In our model, however, it can be seen from (10) and (11) that the standard result of
policy convergence in the probabilistic voting model does not hold when μ 6= 1
2.W h e n
μ>1
2 so that party L has more underlying support in the population and thus an intrinsic
advantage over party C,p a r t yL oﬀe r sl e s st ov o t e r sa n dp a r t yC more to voters than
i nt h es y m m e t r i cc a s e . T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h i si st h a ti nt h i sc a s ei ft h ep o l i c i e so ﬀered
were the same, the probability of L winning would be greater than the probability of C
winning. But this implies that the expected cost of transfers is higher for L than for C.
Thus C oﬀers more than in the symmetric case, while L oﬀers less.
T h ec o n s e q u e n c e so ft h i sf o rt h ee l e c t i o np robability can be found by inserting (10)









From the requirement π ∈ [0,1] the parameter restriction
φ
3h ≤ 1 follows. Note that even if
the politician with a favorable ideological bias oﬀers less to voters, his election probability
is still higher. The eﬀect that politicians with strong ideological support oﬀer less to voters
can never outweigh the eﬀect of strong ideological support itself. This just means that
the endogenous choice of policies does not completely compensate for the bias in favor of
a politician, so that at the Nash equilibrium the politician with a favorable bias still has
a larger probability of winning the election. However, we note that dπ
dμ ≤ 1,s ot h a ta n
increased group share transforms into a smaller increase in the election probability than
10the increase in the group share itself. The reason for this, of course, is that the politician
in part utilizes the increased support by oﬀering less to voters, leaving him better oﬀ both
as a result of an increased election probability and increased rents in case he should win
the election.
By inserting from (10) and (12) in (5) we ﬁnd the expected utility of politician L
under democracy, UD















We note that the utility of politician L increases with μ, so that the larger the group
that ideologically supports the politician, the higher is his expected rents of democracy.
A strong ideological support allows the politician to optimally choose a combination of a
high probability of winning the election and low transfers to voters.
Moreover, and this will turn out to be key to understanding the political choice
between democracy and ﬁghting, the second derivative of UD
L with respect to μ is positive.
The intuition for this can be seen from (10) and (12). Consider the eﬀect of tilting the
distribution of ideology or group size in favor of politician L, i.e. increasing μ.A s c a n
be seen from (10) this decreases the transfers oﬀered by politician L linearly, and thus
also increases the rents of winning the election linearly. As seen from (12) the election
probability is also linear in μ. Consequently, an increased μ increases both the probability
of winning and the prize of winning linearly. As the expected utility of democracy is these
two terms multiplied, this explains why the expected utility increases faster than linearly
with an increased μ.
We can sum up the results of this section with the following result.
Proposition 1 There is a unique democratic Nash Equilibrium where the equilibrium
policy vector satisﬁes (10) and (11), and the expected utility of a party from democratic
competition is a strictly increasing and convex function of its intrinsic support.
B. Fighting
Ad i ﬀerence between democracy and ﬁghting is that with democracy one oﬀers citi-
zens carrots, while with ﬁghting one uses sticks. With elections a politician will not know
11who voted for him and who did not. When it comes to a ﬁght, however, it will be more
transparent who supports a politician and who does not. This opens up the possibility of
making it costly to support “the wrong side”. We assume that if a politician wins power
by a ﬁght, he is able to punish those that did not support him by expropriating a share
τ ≤ 1 of their income. We assume that citizens have the same preferences as before with
respect to consumption and ideology. Since politicians use sticks rather than carrots, we
assume no direct income transfers are given to voters. When it comes to a ﬁght, agents
need to decide which side to support. We denote the probability that politician L wins
the ﬁght by ρ ∈ [0,1]. A particular individual supports L if,
ρy +( 1− ρ)(1 − τ)y>(1 − ρ)y + ρ(1 − τ)y + δ + σ
i. (14)
Here the left hand side is the expected utility to individual i of supporting L;w i t ha
probability ρ party L wins the ﬁght in which case income is y, while with probability
1 − ρ party L looses the ﬁght in which case income is (1 − τ)y. T h u si ti sc o s t l yt o
support the loosing side. The right hand side of the inequality is what individual i gains
by supporting politician C. By rearranging the inequality we get,
σ
i < −δ − (1 − 2ρ)τy. (15)
Denote by nL ∈ [0,1] the expected number of people that supports politician L in a ﬁght
and by 1 − nL those that support politician C. By using the same approach as above we
can then ﬁnd3
nL = μ − h(1 − 2ρ)τy. (16)
To determine the probability of winning a ﬁght we use the standard contest success
function of Tullock (1975) which has by now become standard in the literature on conﬂict
(see Powell, 1993, 1999). Thus
ρ =
nL
nL +( 1− nL)
= nL. (17)
3More formally nL =m a x [ 0 ,min[μ − h(1 − 2ρ)τy,1]]. Thus note that the requirement that nL ∈
[0,1], implies that if μ − h(1 − 2ρ)τy<0,t h e nnL =0 , while if μ − h(1 − 2ρ)τy>1,t h e nnL =1 .






The politician that wins a ﬁght captures the rents R minus the eventual costs D ≥ 0
that may arise due to destruction because of ﬁghting. In addition he expropriates income
from those who did not support him in the ﬁght. Thus politician L’s expected utility of
ﬁghting, UF
L ,i sg i v e nb yUF
L = ρ[R − D +( 1− nL)τy].


















The ﬁrst derivative of UF

















Al a r g e rμ has two eﬀects on the payoﬀ from ﬁghting. First, the direct eﬀect of an
increased μ is increased support and thus an increased probability of winning the ﬁght.
Second, an increased μ makes the rents from winning smaller as the income expropriated
from losers will be smaller. It is evident from (20) that the ﬁrst eﬀect will always dominate
for small μ, while
∂UF
L (μ)
∂μ may become negative for high μ if R − D is suﬃciently small.
Note however that since the interesting case is R−D>0,w eh a v e
∂UF
L (0)
∂μ > 0.T h u se v e n
i nt h ec a s ew h e r e
∂UF
L (μ)
∂μ becomes negative it must start positive and then change sign as
μ increases.
Furthermore, note from (20) that the second derivative of UF







Thus the utility of ﬁghting is concave in μ. The intuition for this is straightforward.
Winning a ﬁght means winning the possibility of punishing the losers by expropriating
4Although it may not be immediately evident it follows that when nL ∈ [0,1],t h e nμ − hτy ≥ 0
and 1 − 2hτy ≥ 0.P r o o f :W h e n nL ≥ 0, then from (16) μ ≥ h(1 − 2ρ)τy. Inserting from (17) this







. Inserting from nL from (18) yields after simple calculation that
μ − hτy ≥ 0.F r o mnL ∈ [0,1] and (18) it then follows that 1 − 2hτy ≥ μ − hτy ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
13part of their income. When μ increases the value of using this punishment is smaller as
there are less losers.5 Hence the following result,
Proposition 2 In the conﬂict model the expected utility of a party from ﬁghting is a
concave function of its intrinsic support μ. The function is strictly increasing in μ when
μ is small (and may for a larger μ be increasing or decreasing in μ).
C. Comparison of Payoﬀs
Taken together, Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that there is no a priori reason
why a group’s relative preference for democracy would increase when its support increases.
This is because the expected utility of ﬁghting also increases with underlying support in
the population. Indeed, we now demonstrate that the expected utility of ﬁghting may
increase faster, thus destabilizing democracy.
Recall that UD
L (μ) denotes the expected utility of party L under democracy when L
has an ideological group of size μ.T h e np a r t yC has an ideological group of size 1−μ,s o
that the corresponding utility of party C is UD
C (1 − μ) etc. Democracy is then preferred





L (μ), and (22)
U
D
C (1 − μ) >U
F
C(1 − μ), (23)
which imply that for both parties, the expected utility of democracy must be greater than
that of ﬁghting. Obviously, democracy can only be an equilibrium if it is preferred by
both parties. One party preferring to ﬁght is enough for democracy to collapse.
Furthermore, since the eﬀect of group size μ on the expected utility of party L is
exactly the same as the eﬀect of group size 1 − μ for party C, we can restate these
5As we have modelled it above people divide their support between the politicians without getting
paid for ﬁghting. If the supporters (or soldiers) are hired at a constant wage w as often assumed in the
standard conﬂict literature, the payoﬀ from ﬁghting would be given by UF
L = ρ[R−D+(1−nL)τy]−wnL.














, i.e. introducing this would have the same eﬀect as






L (μ), and (24)
U
D
L (1 − μ) >U
F
L (1 − μ). (25)
To determine the type of political equilibrium it thus suﬃces to investigate the ex-
pected utility curves of party L. There are three diﬀerent possible types of equilibria in
this model. In the ﬁrst type democracy emerges independently of the level of underlying
support, μ. In the second type of equilibrium ﬁghting results independently of μ.I nt h e
third, and most interesting type, democracy or ﬁghting emerge in a way that depends on
the ideological group size μ.
Consider ﬁrst the case where for all μ we have UD
L (μ) >U F
L (μ). Then democracy will
always emerge. We note from (13) and (19) that this is more likely the lower the rents of
power R and the higher the destruction D.6
Consider next the case where the curves cross once at μ∗,a sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e2 .
When politician L has a small group of ideological supporters he does not ﬁnd it worth-
while to ﬁght for power. Few people support him in the ﬁrst place, and as a consequence
of that his chances of winning are small, making even fewer people support him as they
are afraid of ending up as supporters of the loser. For L accordingly, when μ is less
than μ∗ the payoﬀ from ﬁghting is lower than the payoﬀ from democracy, so L prefers
democracy. Even though a group with such a small amount of support does not do very
well in democracy - there is little chance that it could win an election. Nevertheless, it
does even worse if it ﬁghts. Now note that as μ increases, the expected utility of ﬁghting
increases faster than that of democracy and if μ is higher than μ∗, ﬁghting is preferred
by politician L.W h a ta b o u tt h ep r e f e r e n c e so fC?W h e nμ is smaller than μ∗,s ot h a tL
prefers democracy, 1−μ is bigger than μ∗, and consequently politician C will be in favor
of ﬁghting. Therefore, in this case the type of political equilibrium is independent of μ -
ﬁghting will always result.
Next, consider the case where UD
L and UF
L c r o s st w i c e ,a si nF i g u r e3a n dw h e r eUF
L
cuts UD
L from below at some μS < 1
2. F o rt w oc r o s s i n g st oh a p p e nt h ef o l l o w i n gt h r e e
6Note that the situation UD
L (μ) <U F
L (μ) for all μ can never arise as from (13) and (19) it follows that
UD
L (0) >U F
L (0). Thus the curve for democracy must always start out above the curve for ﬁghting.
















Here politician L prefers ﬁghting for μS <μ<μ H. It follows that politician C prefers
ﬁghting for 1 − μH <μ<1 − μL.T h u si fμS <μ<μ H or 1 − μH <μ<1 − μL ﬁghting
results, while otherwise democracy becomes the equilibrium.
In this case where the distribution of underlying support actually matters for the
equilibrium outcome, it is the likelihood of democracy and not of ﬁghting that is max-
imized for small μ or 1 − μ. In the situation depicted in Figure 3, democracy is most
easily sustained when one group has a very small size and the other has a very big size.
This is contrary to the conventional wisdom which states that when one group is small
ﬁghting is likely to result. Intuitively, when one group is dominant it is almost certain to
win democratic elections. Nevertheless, this does not lead democracy to collapse because
such a dominant group is almost certain to win a ﬁg h ta sw e l l . I nF i g u r e3i ti sw h e n
such a dominant group loses support to an opposition that democracy can collapse.
Another situation, that may initially look favorable to the conventional wisdom, arises
when UF
L cuts UD
L from below at μ∗ > 1
2 as in Figure 4. Now politician L prefers ﬁghting
when μ>μ ∗ > 1
2 while politician C prefers ﬁghting when μ<1 − μ∗ < 1
2.T h u si nt h i s
case democracy arises only when support is balanced - but for the opposite reason from
what the standard wisdom predicts: It is the biggest and not the smallest group that
initiates conﬂict. In fact, if balanced support is necessary for democracy to consolidate,
the only way this can happen is when it is the biggest group that initiates conﬂict. A
result again completely contrary to the conventional wisdom.
The ﬁnal type of situation that can arise when
∂UF
L (μ)
∂μ > 0 is depicted in Figure
5. This is when the curves cross twice but UF
L cuts UD
L from below at μS > 1
2.( A n
equivalent case not drawn is when the curves cross twice and UF
L cuts UD
L from above at
μH < 1
2). Here democracy arises when μ ∈ [1 − μS,μ S], when the two groups are evenly
balanced. Note however, that in this case it is still true that democracy is also stable
when μ ≥ μH, so that it is not a necessary condition for democratic consolidation that
16support be balanced.




∂μ > 0 for small μ but for higher μ,
∂UF
L (μ)
∂μ < 0. The preceding
Figures show that this does not introduce any new phenomena. There are two cases,
either UF
L cuts UD
L once from below and the situation is qualitatively the same as Figures
2 and 4. Alternatively, UF
L cuts UD
L twice, ﬁrst from below and then from above, in which
case we again have the two possibilities drawn in Figures 3 and 5.
Taken collectively this exhaustive analysis of the diﬀerent possible cases has an im-
portant implication. In no part of the parameter space is the conventional wisdom correct.
Even in the case of Figure 4 where democracy does dominate for symmetric distributions
of support, when ﬁghting dominates it is the stronger group which initiates it. So it is
never the case that symmetric distributions of support are required for a democracy to be
stable because otherwise the group which does relatively poorly in democracy will ﬁght
for power.
III. Colombia’s La Violencia
The model above suggests that it is entirely plausible that the conventional wisdom
is completely wrong. To our knowledge there is no evidence which supports this or test of
the idea that democracy is consolidated when political power is balanced. Moreover, it is
quite easy to think of many other counterexamples. For instance, the conventional wisdom
suggests that the rising support for the Nazi Party in Germany in the early 1930s should
have helped to consolidate the Weimar Republic, which is not an obviously plausible
conjecture. Nevertheless, it could be correct. It is diﬃcult to test the above model using
cross-national data for several reasons. First, it is hard to identify in cross-national data
the underlying support for diﬀerent groups or parties. Sometimes this may be possible
when voting is along pure ethnic lines, as in Mauritius and Guyana at independence. In
the case of South Africa we could identify the Whites, Cape Coloureds and those of East
Indian descent as one group and black Africans as another (though again this case does
not look good for the conventional wisdom). Yet even here the situation is clouded by the
great heterogeneity of political identities and cleavages within the majority black African
17community. Second, though one could look at variables such as the electoral outcomes
before coups, there are huge issues of endogeneity and omitted variable bias which will be
hard to solve. Finally, to take the model to the cross-national data it would be desirable
to have a richer sense of the observable circumstances which lead ﬁghting to dominate
democracy.
Though testing the model is diﬃcult, in this section we provide some evidence con-
cerning a key implication of the model - other things equal, ﬁghting may be attractive
precisely when the support of diﬀerent parties is balanced. We do so in the context of La
Violencia, a civil war which gripped Colombia between 1946 and 1963. There are several
features of this conﬂict which make it ideal. First, it is a clear case where ﬁghting was
along party political lines. Indeed, from the formation of the Liberal and Conservative
parties which ﬁrst contested a presidential election in recognizable form in 1850, conﬂict
has been along party lines. After 1850 the parties competed in elections and fought con-
tinual civil wars over the results. There was therefore a recurring interplay between voting
and ﬁghting (see Mazzuca and Robinson, 2006, for an analysis of this inter-relationship
for the structure of the electoral system in Colombia). Second, the apparently enduring
nature of political identities in Colombia makes it relatively straightforward to measure
the intrinsic support or strength of the parties.
A. A Brief Historical Sketch of La Violencia
We now provide a quick sketch of the relevant period, accessible general accounts
as Bushnell (1993, Chapter 9) and Saﬀord and Palacios (2002, Chapter 14) with useful
more specialized overviews being Oquist (1980) or LeGrand (1997). The traditional his-
toriography isolates the period between 1850, when the Liberal Party ﬁr s tc a m et op o w e r ,
and 1886, when the Conservatives regained power, as the “Liberal Republic.” After 1886,
the Conservative party ruled until they split in the 1930 Presidential election and lost to
the Liberal Enrique Olaya Herrera. This created a new Liberal regime whose hegemony
collapsed at the beginning of La Violencia. The early decades of the century had been
relatively peaceful in Colombia, coming in the wake of the most murderous and damaging
of the civil wars - the “War of a Thousand days” which ended in 1902. After the ascension
of power by the Liberals in 1930, however, politics became more polarized. This was par-
18ticularly so after the Presidency fell to Alfonso López Pumarejo in 1934. López Pumarejo
launched what he called the “Revolution on the March” which involved the introduction
of universal male suﬀrage and a whole vector of social reforms. López Pumarejo also
attempted to implement agrarian reforms in order to pacify the countryside where there
had been continual violence and land occupations for decades. The 1930s were an era of
rapid social change, industrialization and urbanization in Colombia and the Liberal party
attempted to reposition itself in policy space in order to appeal to the newly articulated
interests, particularly organized labor and those on the left who supported the dissident
Liberal caudillo, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. López Pumarejo was followed in the presidency by
Eduardo Santos, but was re-elected in 1942. During this period the Conservative party
moved further to the right under the leadership of Laureano Gómez and politics became
more and more polarized. López Pumarejo resigned after a failed coup attempt in 1945
and in the 1946 presidential election the Conservative Mariano Ospina Pérez defeated a
Liberal party which split its support between Gaitán, running as an independent Liberal,
and the oﬃcial candidate Gabriel Turbay.
The return of the Conservative party led to heightened tensions since many Liberals
in the bureaucracy were replaced by Conservatives and low levels conﬂict between the
parties commenced. In consequence 1946 is usually taken to be the start of what came to
be La Violencia (Bushnell, 1993, p. 204). On 9th of April 1948 Gaitán was assassinated
in Bogotá and massive urban riots and conﬂi c tb r o k eo u ta l lo v e rt h ec o u n t r y .A f t e rt h i s
Ospina Pérez declared a state of siege and soon after closed the Congress. All over the
country Liberal and Conservative groups formed militias and fought for control of the
countryside. In the 1950 presidential election the Liberals refused to run a candidate and
Laureano Gómez was elected unopposed. The regime Gómez constructed was aimed to
institutionalize Conservative dominance and his virulent anti-Liberalism eventually even
a l i e n a t e dh i so w ns u p p o r t e r s . H ew a so v e r t h r o w nb yam i l i t a r yc o u pi n1 9 5 3l e db y
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla which attracted wide support from Conservatives as well
as Liberals. Rojas Pinilla initially had some success in reducing the extent of violence and
managed to persuade many Liberal ﬁghters to give up their arms. However, the ﬁghting
soon intensiﬁed and it became clear that a real reconciliation between the parties was
required for peace to return. This happened in a series of meetings in Sitges in Spain in
191957 and later that year Rojas Pinilla was deposed by a military junta paving the way
for the emergence of the National Front regime in 1958. This regime was a pact between
the parties which legislated explicit power sharing at all levels of the administration and
government in an attempt to guarantee an equal share of the spoils of oﬃce to both
parties. After this reconciliation between the parties many independent guerilla groups
that the conﬂict had created persisted until the early 1960s.
The historical evidence suggest that we can diﬀerentiate between two main periods
of La Violencia. and the empirical evidence in Chacón (2005) suggests that there were
qualitative diﬀerences between the period of the early violence (1946-1953) and the late
violence period (1957-1963). In particular after the military coup and the subsequent
creation of the National Front regime, the conﬂict became less and less along party lines
and became much more of a guerilla conﬂict. Since our model is about ﬁghts for power
between well deﬁned political groups, not guerilla warfare, we restrict our empirical analy-
sis to the early period. Moreover, due to data availability we focus only on the period
1946-1950.
IV. The Data
There are two crucial sorts of data for our empirical work. The ﬁrst is a measure
of the underlying support for the two political parties. To measure this we use the
election results from the 1946 presidential election at the municipality level. As noted
above, there were two Liberals candidates, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán and Gabriel Turbay
competing against the Conservative Mariano Ospina Pérez. We aggregate the votes for
the two Liberal candidates. This is a plausible source for the variable we need because of
the fact that political identity was enduring over time which means that these numbers
give a good idea of support even subsequently in the 1950s. Moreover, in 1946 power
switched from the Liberals to the Conservatives and this is indicative of the fact that this
was a relatively uncorrupt election so that the recorded vote totals are meaningful. We
constructed various measures of political competition from these numbers. The left panel
of Figure 6 shows the municipalities with Liberal and Conservative majorities for the 1946
presidential elections. Of the 755 municipalities for which there is available information,
65% had a Liberal electoral majority. Of this 65%, only 19% were electorally competitive
20(deﬁned as a situation where the Liberals won between 51% and 60% of the vote). This
numbers indicate that in the great majority of Liberal municipalities there was political
hegemony. This percentage is similar for the municipalities with Conservative electoral
majorities. Only 20% of these were competitive in the 1946 election. The right panel
of Figure 6 distinguishes between municipalities with and without electoral competition.
We see that the competitive municipalities were mainly located in the departments of
Antioquia, Viejo Caldas (subsequently divided into the modern departments of Caldas,
Quindío and Risaralda), Tolima and Valle.
We used this political data in two ways. The ﬁrst is just to construct a measure
of political competition based on the margin between the two vote totals. We did this
by taking the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the percentages of liberal and
conservative votes. Therefore the measurement of political competition used is:
Political Competition =1− |%Liberal-%Conservative|/100
O nt h eo n eh a n dw h e nt h ev o t et o t a l sf o rt h et w op a r t i e sa r et h es a m e ,w eh a v eah i g h l y
competitive environment and the index takes the value of 1. On the other hand, when
all of the votes go to one of the other parties we have complete hegemony and the index
taxes the value of 0. The second way we looked at the data was to construct some
dummy variables which classify municipalities according to the percentage of the vote for
each party. Municipalities with 80% or more of votes for the Liberal party were classiﬁed
as a situation with “Liberal hegemony,” municipalities where the Liberals won between
6 0 %a n d7 9 %w e r ec l a s s i ﬁed as being under “Liberal control”. We classiﬁed municipalities
where the Conservative party won in the same way. Finally, we classiﬁed municipalities
where one party won by less than 10% as competitive.
The second main type of data we need are measures of political conﬂict or ﬁghting.
Here we use two sources. Unfortunately, we have oﬃcial information for the homicide rate
only at the departmental level. We therefore coded a dummy variable which indicates
the occurrence of violent deaths in a municipality (it takes the value of 1 if violent deaths
were registered in the period 1946-1950 and 0 if not). The information on violent deaths
was collected from several sources, speciﬁcally the more specialized regional studies by
Ortiz (1985), Henderson (1985), Guerrero (1991), Uribe (1996), Roldán (2002) and Pécaut
21(2001). Particularly important is the two volume work by Guzmán Campos et al. (1980)
which attempted to provide a comprehensive overview of La Violencia.F i g u r e 7 s h o w s
the location of the municipalities which experienced partisan violence in this period.
In order to measure the intensity of the municipal violence we used the same sources
as above to construct a variable capturing number of years in which the municipality reg-
istered violent deaths directly related to the partisan conﬂict. This integer scale therefore
goes from 0 to 4.
In addition to these basic dependent and explanatory variables we used other vari-
ables to try to control for factors whose omission might bias the estimated relationship
between political competition and ﬁghting. We ﬁrst used a group of exogenous geograph-
ical variables, namely latitude, altitude, the distance in kilometers between municipalities
and the department capital, various measures of soil types and surface area in square
kilometers. All these variables were taken from the municipal data base of the CEDE
of the University of the Andes in Bogotá. A serious concern in estimating the causal
eﬀect of political competition on violence is that the relationship may be inﬂuenced by
omitted variables which help to determine both the extent of political competition and
violence. One idea might be that both of these stem from underlying variation in the
socio-economic structure of municipalities. By using the geographical variables therefore
we are using an exogenous source of variation which hopefully picks up important aspects
of this varying socio-economic structure. We should add however that the political geog-
raphy of Colombia is enormously complex (see Pinzón de Lewin, 1989) and certainly deﬁes
any simple explanation in terms of economic interests. Historically various parts of the
country identiﬁed with the diﬀerent parties, for example Antioquia with the Conservative
party, Santander with the Liberal party, and there also appear to be many idiosyncratic
sources of variation.
To further control for possibly relevant socio-economic factors we also used the liter-
acy rate and a measurement of municipal urbanization. The literacy rate was calculated
as the population that knew how to read divided by the number population over seven
years of age. The measurement of urbanization was calculated as the proportion of the
population living in urban areas divided by the total municipality population. These
variables were calculated using the data from the 1951 National Census. Since a lot of
22the discussion of La Violencia by historians and political scientists suggests that violence
m a yh a v eb e e np a r t i c u l a r l yp r o n o u n c e di nt h ec o ﬀee growing areas, we also used data
from the late 1920s Monsalve (1927) on the incidence of coﬀee growing. Speciﬁcally, we
calculated the total number of coﬀee trees per municipality divided by the population.
Our ﬁnal strategy to try to control for omitted variables is to use departmental
ﬁxed eﬀects. Colombia is traditionally thought of as a country of great regional divides
and strong regional and departmental identities (as in our observations about Antioquia
and Santander above). Historically this has been reﬂected in the relatively decentralized
political system in Colombia with departments having a large degree of autonomy. Indeed,
after the Rionegro Constitution of 1863 during the Liberal republic, Colombia became a
hyper-federal country where the national army did not have the right to intervene in the
aﬀairs of individual states! However, the system was to an extent re-centralized after
1886. In consequence many of the potentially omitted factors that might jointly inﬂuence
patterns of political identity and violence could vary systematically across departments.
Hence including departmental ﬁxed eﬀects is an attractive way of trying to control for
such factors.
Another concern about potential endogeneity, particularly given Colombia’s history,
is that the spatial location of violence is highly persistent. If political parties then move to
control such municipalities then in estimating the casual eﬀect of political competition it
would be desirable to try to control for past conﬂicts. Though detailed information does
not exist from 19th century civil wars or the War of a Thousand Days on the location
of conﬂict, there does exist fairly comprehensive data collected by LeGrand (1988) on
agrarian conﬂicts. LeGrand (1988) shows that the department that reported the greatest
number of these type of conﬂicts during the period 1901-1931, was the Viejo Magdalena
department (actually the departments of Magdalena, Cesar and Guajira) with a total of
108 reported conﬂicts. For the same period, the region of Viejo Bolivar (currently the
Bolivar, Cordoba and Sucre departments) with 86 reported cases. These regions exhibited
the lowest homicides rates during la Violencia. LeGrand (1988) also collected information
of the distribution of public lands, something often initiated as an attempt to defuse rural
conﬂict. From LeGrand’s work we constructed several variables, the number of territorial
concessions made, the number of hectares of public land granted, and the number of
23reported agrarian conﬂicts over uncultivated public lands. These variables are available
for the periods 1827-1869, 1870-1900, 1901-1918 and 1918 -1931. Table I records the basic
descriptive statistics of the data.
V. Empirical Results
A. Linear Models
We our start our empirical analysis by estimating a linear probability model of the
form
di = γci + x
0
iβ + μj + vi, (26)
where di ∈ {0,1} is a dummy variable which takes the value one if violence was present in
municipality i during the period 1946 to 1950, ci is our measure of political competition in
municipality i, μj is a ﬁxed eﬀect for department j and vi is an error term which we assume
is orthogonal to the explanatory variables. x0
i is a vector containing all the covariates or
control variables. The coeﬃcient of interest here is γ. Note that to consistently estimate
γ by OLS we require that cov (ci,v i)=cov (xz
i,v i)=0for all z where xz
i is the jth
element of the vector xi. In other words, this type of estimation requires that there be no
omitted variables correlated with the right-hand side variables in the model. This could
be problematic if there were municipality characteristics that inﬂuenced both the extent
of political support for the parties and also the propensity for violence. The best way
of dealing with this issue would be to have an instrument for ci. Since we do not have
such an instrument, we have to be cautious in interpreting our estimates of γ as being the
true causal eﬀect. Nevertheless, as we noted above, the origins of political identities in
Colombia seem to lie deep in idiosyncratic historical events of the nineteenth century, and
are not closely associated with such things as land inequality or socio-economic structure.
These facts lead us to be relatively conﬁdent that we can treat ci as econometrically
exogenous.
Table II provides the basic results from the estimation of equation (26) by OLS.7 Col-
umn 1 contains the simplest regression of the dummy for the presence of violence against
7Since heteroskedasticity is prevalent in linear probability models, in all tables we report
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
24our measure of political competition. The estimated coeﬃcient suggests that the greater
is political competition, the greater is the probability of violence in the municipality. Col-
u m n2l o o k sa tt h i si nad i ﬀerent way by using dummy variables corresponding to the
classiﬁcation of municipalities described above. Here the coeﬃcients should be interpreted
as relative to the omitted category, which is Conservative hegemony (more than 80% of
conservative vote share). The estimated coeﬃcients suggest that any movement away
from Conservative hegemony increases the probability of violence with the movement to
political competition having the largest estimated eﬀect, consistent with the results in
column 1.
In the two next columns we return to the basic measure of political competition
to check the robustness of our result. In column 3 we add a full set of geographical and
economic controls and also our data on the distribution of government lands and historical
land conﬂicts. We also add a dummy variable for whether or not a municipality has a
Liberal majority to check whether or not the eﬀect of political competition depends on
which party has the (small) majority. The important thing to note from this and the last
two columns of the table is how robust the estimated coeﬃcient on political competition
is. Both the estimated coeﬃcient and the standard error are relatively unchanged by
the addition of many diﬀerent types of covariates. From the variables capturing land
grants or land conﬂicts, only the one measuring the number of land concessions per-capita
has a signiﬁcant over the presence of violence. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that previous land
concessions tend to reduce the probability that a municipality will be violent. Moreover,
historical land conﬂicts are associated with a greater probability of experiencing violence.
Also, we ﬁnd that conditional on there being political competition, municipalities with a
Liberal majority do have a higher probability of experiencing violence. In column 4 we
add a full set of departmental ﬁxed eﬀects to try to control for omitted variables which
are common at the departmental level. As we see, the results are very robust even after
controlling for these ﬁxed eﬀects.
In the ﬁnal two columns of Table II, as a further robustness check, we also take into
account the possibility of spatial autocorrelation. This a serious concern because our ob-
servations are spatially correlated, which means that the observations of a geographical
unit do not depend only of the characteristics of this unit but also on the characteristics
25of other neighboring units.8Spatial dependency can be due to the fact that the variable
measured goes beyond the boundaries of the spatial unit and may have a regional di-
mension. Thus, if spatial dependence is an issue, ignoring it would lead to unbiased and
inconsistent estimates of γ. To allow for the possibility of such eﬀects we estimated a
model of the form
di = ρWd + γci + x
0
iβ + μj + vi, (27)
where d =( d1,d 2,.,d n) and W is a spatial weighting matrix. This is an inverse distances
matrix, standardized by rows, in which element ik (with i 6= k) contains the inverse
of the distance between the center of municipality i and the center of municipality k.
This matrix was calculated for all the municipalities in the sample using geographical
coordinates. This speciﬁcation was chosen since we want to analyze if the expected
interactions between violent municipalities is an inverse function of the distance between
them.
Columns 5 and 6 contain the estimation of (27) using diﬀerent sets of covariates. The
models were estimated using the maximum likelihood method for autoregressive models
with spatially lagged dependent variable proposed by LeSage (1999).9 The results of these
models conﬁrms the robustness of the estimates obtained previously. The estimated eﬀect
of political competition on the probability that a municipality will be violent obtained in
the linear-probability model is completely robust to correcting for the presence of spatial
eﬀects.
Table III investigates the robustness of the eﬀect of political competition on municipal
violence taking the count variable previously described as dependent variable. Here we
replicate all the estimations presented in Table II. Thus, the model estimated in columns
1 though 5 is exactly the same as (26) but with a dependent variable yi such that yi ∈
{0,1,2,3,4}. Again we ﬁnd a very strong, positive, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of our
political competition variable.
8This is what in the spatial econometrics literature is known as spatial dependence. Spatial depen-
dence is similar to temporal dependence displayed by time-series, which is corrected using lag operators.
Nevertheless, the spatial eﬀects cannot be corrected in the same way due to the multidirectional eﬀects
that potentially exist between spatial units.
9This result is also robust to heteroscedastic errors. For more details see Chacón (2005).
26B. Non-Linear Models
One common argument against the linear probability model is that some ﬁtted values
may lie outside the zero-one interval. Since our main interest is to consistently estimate
γ, the fact that some predicted values are outside this interval is not very important.
However, our estimate could be biased because the linear model implies that a ceteris
paribus change in ci has a constant eﬀect over the probability of violence, regardless of
the initial level of ci. To address these limitations we estimated a standard probit model
of the form
prob(di =1| ci,xi)=Φ(γci + x
0
iβ+μj), (28)
where Φ(.) represents the standard normal distribution function. To check the perfor-
mance of the point estimates obtained by our linear speciﬁcation (26) we can compare
them with the partial (marginal) eﬀects of the probit model. Table IV presents the results
from the estimation of equation (28) via Maximum Likelihood. In column 1 we replicate a
regression including our political competition measurement as the only explanatory vari-
able. Again, the results suggest that greater is political competition, the greater is the
probability of violence. The magnitude of this eﬀect indicates that the diﬀerence in prob-
ability between a municipality with absolute hegemony of any of the two parties and one
in which there is perfect electoral competition is 21%. Remarkably, this eﬀect is very close
to the one obtained by the linear probability model (19%) and is robust to the inclusion
of departmental ﬁxed-eﬀect and all other controls. This validates the robustness of the
estimated coeﬃcient on political competition and the performance of our linear model.
Finally, in the last two columns of Table IV we turn to the determinants of the
intensity of the conﬂict using the count variable we described above - the number of years
that the municipality was violent. Since the dependent variable now takes integer values,
0,1,2,3,4 we investigate the impact of political competition on the intensity of conﬂict by







where yi ∈ {0,1,2,3,4}. λi represents the conditional mean of yi and is assumed to take
27the functional form lnλi = γci + x0
iβ+ μj (Wooldridge, 2002, Chapter 19). Column 5
presents the model where we only include dummy-variables according to electoral cat-
egorization. Once more and consistent with our previous ﬁnding, the higher values of
yi are predicted for municipalities moving away from Conservative hegemony to a full
electoral competition. In column 6 we present the complete model including the electoral
competition measure plus the full set of controls.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper we have argued that the conventional wisdom about the circumstances
under which democracy is consolidated is ﬂawed. The existing literature has focused on
the idea that political parties or groups will agree to play by the rules of the democratic
game when they anticipate that they can win power with a suﬃciently large probability.
Obviously, such a calculation is relevant to determining whether or not democracy will
be stable, and considering it is therefore a necessary part of the study of democratic
consolidation. However, in this paper we show that it is not suﬃcient to consider this
probability. This is because factors that inﬂuence the probability that a party wins power
under democracy will also inﬂuence its ability to win a ﬁght if it decides to violate the
democratic rules. In particular this implies that an increase in the underlying support that
a party has in the population does not necessarily improve the prospects for democratic
consolidation because the expected utility of ﬁghting for power may increase faster than
the expected utility of playing by the rules of the democratic game.
We constructed a simple model of two party competition to investigate how the
expected utilities of democracy and ﬁghting depend on the distribution of support in
society. Though both the model of democratic politics and ﬁghting are entirely standard
we showed that in a wide class of cases democracy may only be consolidated when one
party was hegemonic. In these situations, when the two parties are evenly balanced, the
situation where the conventional wisdom predicts that democracy is most likely to be
consolidated, one or both of the parties prefers to ﬁght for power because the probability
of winning is suﬃciently high. Also, we showed that when balanced support was necessary
for democracy to consolidate this is not so because the weakest party will otherwise choose
ﬁghting, but because the strongest party will do so. Again, this is completely contrary to
28the conventional wisdom.
A model does not of course prove that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Never-
theless, the model does illustrate that the existing literature is logically incomplete and
the real relation between political support and democratic consolidation must be much
more complex than has been recognized. Clearly what is required is serious empirical
work on this topic. Though we did not provide a test of the conventional wisdom here,
we did use data from La Violencia,ac i v i lw a rw h i c hi n ﬂuenced Colombia between 1946
and the early 1960s, to examine one key possibility derived from the model - that violence
and ﬁghts for power can occur when the support for political parties is evenly balanced.
The Colombian evidence is tentative, since we cannot be completely conﬁdent that we
have estimated the causal eﬀect of political competition on ﬁghting, but nevertheless the
results we presented show that, other things equal, greater political competition at the
municipality level during this period in Colombia was associated with greater violence.
This is not consistent with the conventional wisdom, but it is consistent with our model.
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µH µS 1-µS 1-µHFigure 6: 1946 Presidential Election ResultsFigure 7: Violent Municipalities, 1946-1950Table I-Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable  No. Percentage  Mean 
Violent Municipalities 1946-1950 184 24.4
Political Variables 
Liberal Hegemony  184 24.4
Conservative Hegemony  112 14.8
Liberal Control  214 28.3
Conservative Control  98 13.0
Electoral Competition  147 19.5
Liberal Majority  494 65.4
Land Variable 
Land Concessions  256 33.9
Land Conflicts  173 22.9
Granted Land (percentage of arable land)  0.06 (0.21)
Economic Controls 
Literacy Rate  0.49 (0.15)
Rural Index 0.75 (0.2)
Urban Index 0.24 (0.2)
Log GDP per capita  0.25 (0.55)
Cafetos per capita  1.34 (0.55)
Number of Observations  755





















 Table II- OLS & Spatial Estimates 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
OLS OLS OLS OLS Spatial Autoregressive
Dependent Variable: Municipal Violence 
Political Competition  0.22 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.19
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Liberal Hegemony*  0.13
(0.03)






Liberal Majority*  0.09 0.08 0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Land Concessions (per capita) -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.001)
Granted Land (% municipality surface) 0.06 -0.05 -0.060
(0.08) (0.12) (0.008)
Land Conflicts  -0.002 0.01 0.010
(0.01) (0.01) (0.008)
Spatial Lag (dependent variable) 0.25 0.110
(0.05) (0.02)
Geographical Controls  No No Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls  No No Yes Yes Yes
Departmental Fixed Effects  No No No Yes Yes
R
2 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.19 0.02 0.18
Number of observations 755 755 755 755 755 755  
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *Dummy variables.   
 


















 Table III- OLS & Spatial Estimatesª 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
OLS OLS OLS OLS Spatial 
Dependent Variable: Number of violent years
Political Competition  0.28 0.16 0.27 0.27
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Liberal Hegemony*  0.17
(0.06)






Liberal Majority*  0.13 0.11 0.11
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Land Concessions (per capita) -0.001 -0.002 -0.004
(0.001) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Granted Land (% municipality surface) -0.04 -0 14 -0 .04
(0.1) (0.15) (0.14)
Land Conflicts  -0.01 -0.003 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Spatial Lag (dependent variable) 0.03
(0.04)
Geographical Controls  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Economic Controls  No No Yes Yes Yes
Departmental Fixed Effects  No No No Yes Yes
R
2 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.17 0.17
Number of observations 755 755 755 755 755  















Table IV- Limited Dependent Variable Modelsª 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Probit Probit Probit Probit  Poisson Poisson 
Dependent Variable:
Dependent Variable: Municipal Violence Number Violent Years
Political Competition  0.23 0.14 0.21 0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Liberal Hegemony*  0.2 0.37
(0.07) (0.19)
Liberal Control*  0.29 0.53
(0.06) (0.2)
Political Competition* 0.34 0.62
(0.07) (0.25)
Conservative Control* 0.25 0.54
(0.08) (0.28)
Liberal Majority*  0.10 0.09 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Land Concessions (per capita) -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0008)
Granted Land (% municipality surface) 0.02 -0.04 -0.03
(0.06) 0.09 (0.03)
Land Conflicts  [0] 0.006 [0]
(0.008)
Geographical Controls  No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Economic Controls  No No Yes Yes No Yes
Departmental Fixed Effects  No No No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R
2 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.17 0,02 0.16
Number of observations 755 755 755 755 755 755  
a:Marginal effects calculated at the mean of the explanatory variables reported. Robust 
heteroskedastic standard errors in parenthesis. *Dummy variables.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 